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Foreword 
Late in 2000, I and others undertook some discussions with Dr David Cousins of 
the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (ACCC) about research 
that could be conducted under the auspices of the ACCC on consumer and 
competition issues and Indigenous Australians. Subsequently, a number of 
organisations were invited to provide proposals to the ACCC to undertake such 
research for an initial 12-month period. In May 2001, the Centre for Aboriginal 
Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) at the Australian National University (ANU) 
was commissioned by the ACCC to undertake this research, specifically on the 
implications of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) for Indigenous communities. 
The project is based on two key approaches: literature search and analysis, and 
field-based data collection and analysis. Given the perceived dearth of research in 
this general area, the agenda for the project was negotiable within the broad 
parameters outlined in an agreement between the ANU and the ACCC. Priorities 
were established by a Project Steering Committee representing the ACCC (David 
Cousins and Petras Kruzas), the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (Geoff Richardson, David Thompson and Les O’Donoghue 
sequentially) and CAEPR (myself). CAEPR also established a Project Advisory 
Committee with membership drawn from within CAEPR (John Taylor, Boyd 
Hunter and myself); from the Division of Management and Technology at the 
University of Canberra (Anne Daly); and more recently from the ANU’s Law 
Faculty (Alex Bruce). CAEPR staff working on the project include Sally Ward, 
Siobhan McDonnell, David Martin and myself. The initial project output was 
CAEPR Working Paper No. 12, ‘Indigenous Australians and competition and 
consumer issues: A review of the literature and an annotated bibliography’ by Jon 
Altman, Siobhan McDonnell and Sally Ward. A final paper on the Aboriginal arts 
industry will be published as CAEPR Discussion Paper 235. 
This Discussion Paper examines key competition and consumer issues faced by 
Aboriginal people in remote Aboriginal communities with particular reference to 
provisions of the TPA. It addresses the implications of some specific economic 
practices of Aboriginal consumers and Aboriginal businesses, with a focus on 
community stores. The work reflects field-based research undertaken during a 
two-week visit to a number of localities in central Australia by David Martin and 
Siobhan McDonnell in August–September 2001.  
The collaboration between all stakeholders in this project has been extremely 
positive and productive. I would like to thank the ACCC for sponsoring this 
research and I trust that it will be of relevance, when disseminated, both to policy 
makers and to Indigenous interests. This CAEPR output complements the final 
project report, Competition and Consumer Issues for Indigenous Australians, that 
will be published by the ACCC later in 2002. 
Professor Jon Altman 
Director, CAEPR 
June 2002 
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Summary 
This paper examines key competition and consumer issues faced by Aboriginal 
people in remote Aboriginal communities, with particular reference to the 
provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA). The research was commissioned 
by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), and addresses 
the implications for the operation of the TPA of some specific economic practices 
of Aboriginal consumers and Aboriginal businesses. The research that informs 
this paper consisted of a literature review and fieldwork undertaken in 2001 in 
community stores in six communities and two pastoral station stores.  
The first part of this paper establishes a conceptual framework, termed the 
‘frontier economy’, through which issues relevant to Aboriginal consumers and 
businesses can be explored. Part two of the paper reviews the ways in which some 
Aboriginal consumers engage with the market, as part of a discussion of the 
‘special characteristics’ of Aboriginal consumers that potentially leave them 
vulnerable to commercial exploitation. It argues that certain transactions may be 
both commercially exploitative and instances of instrumental Aboriginal action, or 
agency. Moving from consumers to Aboriginal businesses, part three examines 
factors which may inhibit the operation of competitive markets in remote 
Aboriginal communities, with reference to the operation of community stores. 
Finally, part four of the paper returns to the concepts of the ‘frontier economy’ 
and Aboriginal agency, and discusses the implications of these concepts for ACCC 
compliance and education strategies. 
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Introduction 
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) is the principal source of consumer protection 
and product liability laws in Australia. Its purpose is to enhance ‘the welfare of 
Australians through the promotion of competition and fair trading and provision 
of consumer protection’ (s. 2 TPA). The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) is the statutory authority which administers the operation of 
the TPA.  
In May 2001, the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) at the 
Australian National University (ANU) was commissioned by the ACCC to 
undertake research on the implications of the TPA to Aboriginal communities. 
This research project had the following aims: 
• to identify and review relevant Australian and overseas literature (e.g. from 
the United States, Canada and New Zealand) concerning Indigenous 
communities and their engagement in business activities and the economy 
generally; 
• to identify and particular TPA-related issues relevant to Indigenous 
communities through a series of case studies; 
• to identify special characteristics of Indigenous communities which make 
individuals and local businesses susceptible to commercial exploitation; 
which inhibit competitive processes from delivering benefits enjoyed by other 
communities (market failure); and which should be taken into account in 
any ACCC compliance or education strategy; and 
• to broaden the Commission’s knowledge of TPA-related issues that are likely 
to affect Indigenous communities. 
The first of these aims has been addressed, in part, in the working paper and 
literature review prepared by CAEPR in 2001 (see Altman, McDonnell & Ward 
2001). This paper stems primarily from issues raised by that literature review, 
and by a brief two-week field trip that the authors undertook in August and 
September 2001 to central Australia. It is divided into four parts. The first 
establishes a conceptual framework, termed the ‘frontier economy’, through 
which TPA issues relevant to Aboriginal consumers and businesses can be 
explored. The second part of the paper explores some of the ‘special 
characteristics’ of Aboriginal consumers that potentially increase their 
vulnerability to commercial exploitation. Moving from consumers to Aboriginal 
communities, part three examines factors which may inhibit the operation of 
competitive markets in remote Aboriginal communities, with reference to the 
operation of community stores. Finally, part four of the paper returns to the 
concept of the ‘frontier economy’ and to the question of Aboriginal agency, and 
discusses the implications of these for ACCC compliance and education 
strategies. 
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The focus on community stores  
A community store is defined here as a store run under Aboriginal control and 
located in a remote Aboriginal community. A large proportion of stores in remote 
Aboriginal communities fit this definition, in that they are owned and governed by 
Aboriginal bodies. Community stores are central institutions in remote Aboriginal 
communities, for a number of reasons. The store is often the main socioeconomic 
enterprise in the community (Roberts 1994: 5), and the main provider of food for 
many people (both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) in the community. Moreover 
community stores are often the only providers of banking services (see Altman, 
McDonnell & Ward 2001: 11–12). Community stores thus provide an excellent 
case study for examining the ways Aboriginal businesses operate in an Aboriginal 
domain and how this may differ from commercially operated businesses in the 
non-Aboriginal economy. Where appropriate, the operation of community stores 
will be contrasted with the operation of other types of stores located in or around 
remote Aboriginal communities, for example, pastoral station stores. 
The operation of competitive markets in remote Aboriginal communities is 
circumscribed by structural impediments, in particular transport costs, problems 
of governance, the cultural context, labour costs associated with remoteness, and 
land rights legislation (see Altman, McDonnell & Ward 2001). All of these factors 
impinge upon the operation of community stores as economic enterprises, and on 
competitive markets in remote Aboriginal communities more generally. 
Competition theory postulates that where one or more firms exercise substantial 
market power by raising prices, other firms will be encouraged to enter the 
market. However, there are a number of cultural and structural factors which 
militate against the operation of mature competitive markets in discrete 
Aboriginal communities on Aboriginal lands in the Northern Territory. Effective 
competition has delivered benefits to most Australians, and the premise might be 
that it would have the same effect in remote Aboriginal communities. This paper 
explores the complex reasons why such a premise is not self-evidently true. 
Methodology 
The remote Aboriginal communities visited during fieldwork included Yuendumu, 
Yuelamu, Mutitjulu and Ntaria (Hermannsburg). In addition, two pastoral station 
stores were also visited. Interviews were conducted with the managers of 
community stores and pastoral stations, members of store committees, presidents 
and clerks of local councils, local business people, representatives from various 
community organisations, and Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal members of 
communities. Interviews were also conducted in Alice Springs with ATSIC 
Commissioner Alison Anderson and a number of other ATSIC staff, George James 
(Alice Springs, Department of Fair Trading) and Kevin Rolfe (Tangentyere financial 
counselling officer) as well as employees from a range of accounting firms who 
provide services to community stores. Additional brief fieldwork was conducted by 
Jon Altman and David Martin in Maningrida (Arnhem Land) and Aurukun (Cape 
York) respectively. 
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The methodology adopted is designed to provide the ACCC with an in-depth 
analysis of a particular type of enterprise—the community store. Such research, 
while limited in scope, elucidates some important conceptual and regulatory 
implications for the ACCC. For example, one finding of this research has been the 
diversity of experience and circumstance of Aboriginal consumers and 
businesses.  
A conceptual framework: the ‘frontier economy’ 
By definition, a frontier marks a boundary or an intersection between two 
domains. The ‘frontier economy’ describes the intersection between specific 
Aboriginal economic values and practices, and those of the general market-based 
economy (Fig. 1). The conceptual space so created is the arena (spatial, social, 
political and economic) within which the specific economic practices and values of 
Aboriginal businesses (such as community stores) and Aboriginal consumers 
interact with those of the wider market-based economy. 
Fig. 1. The frontier economy 
 
Aboriginal people bring values and practices to bear on their choices and actions 
as consumers which derive their forms and meanings from within the Aboriginal 
domain. The paper argues that some of the values which inform the choices and 
actions of Aboriginal consumers are different from those of non-Aboriginal people. 
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consumers is the same as that of all other consumers may result in a 
misunderstanding of the commercial relationships entered into by Aboriginal 
consumers. In a worse case scenario it could result in an application of the TPA 
in a way that disadvantages, rather than benefits, Aboriginal consumers. To 
ensure that the TPA is applied in ways that benefit Aboriginal people, analysis of 
prospective breaches of the TPA must be made with reference to the agency of 
Aboriginal consumers. Factors which may impinge on that agency must also be 
taken into account: the experience of Aboriginal consumers, and consumers 
generally, will differ depending on whether they live in a rural, regional or remote 
area, on their level of education and income, and on whether they are employed 
or not, and so on. 
The frontier economy also provides a useful conceptual framework for examining 
community stores, which operate in the zone of intersection between the 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal domains (see Fig. 2). It is argued that the 
operations of community stores in remote Aboriginal communities must be 
interpreted with reference to their cultural context. In this section of the paper, 
the exploration of the cultural context of Aboriginal businesses includes a 
discussion of the governance structure of stores. Such discussion is necessary for 
an understanding of why the frontier economy may operate in a way that is 
different to the non-Aboriginal economy. Martin (1995) posed the question as to 
whether enterprises such as stores are primarily concerned with ‘culture 
business’ or ‘money business’; that is, whether the cultural priorities of an 
Aboriginal community, such as ensuring that revenue is distributed to traditional 
land owners on which the store is located, are more important than making a 
profit.  
Fig. 2. The frontier economy and Aboriginal businesses 
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It is important to note at this juncture that the ‘frontier economy’ is used both as 
an analytical and as a heuristic device in this paper to illustrate certain 
characteristics of the engagement of Aboriginal people and businesses with the 
wider Australian economy. It is not, however, designed to represent the wider 
relationships between Aboriginal groups and societies and the general Australian 
society, since this can be more accurately conceived of in terms of a complex, 
contested ‘intercultural zone’ rather than the interaction between two distinct 
societies (Merlan 1998). 
The term ‘frontier’ is used advisedly, because it has connotations both of regions 
beyond the settled area, and of underdeveloped areas. The concept of the frontier 
economy as used in this paper is not necessarily geographically located solely in 
remote areas, since distinct Aboriginal economic practices can be found in rural 
and urban environments as well as in remote regions (see Macdonald 2000). It 
may be that in identifying Aboriginal TPA-related issues, the particular 
understandings and values that Aboriginal people bring to bear in their 
engagement with the wider economy are more significant than their geographical 
location.  
While geographic ‘remoteness’ is not a defining characteristic of the frontier 
economy, it may nevertheless be a contributing factor to the specific 
characteristics of that economy in remote Australia. For example, Aboriginal 
consumers may be more vulnerable to exploitation in remote as opposed to rural 
and urban areas, partly because of their lower levels of literacy and numeracy. 
Additionally, however, government institutions typically have a less effective 
presence in remote regions, as manifested for example in relatively ineffective law 
enforcement in remote Aboriginal communities. In the recent Cape York Justice 
Study, the Uniting Aboriginal and Islander Christian Congress (UAICC) made a 
submission arguing that in Cape York: 
[t]here is a real issue about whether current policing practices and resources are 
adequate. Overwhelmingly, community leaders have stated that the law is very 
‘weak’ in that community. By this they mean that … law enforcement is weak (Cape 
York Justice Study 2001: 180). 
It is questionable whether regulation alone will guarantee consumer rights in 
remote communities. In places where many government institutions are absent 
and where law enforcement is relatively weak, effective monitoring of regulatory 
compliance is necessarily compromised.   
The argument in terms of the frontier economy is designed to alert readers to the 
importance of the cross-cultural dimensions of the market’s operation in remote 
Aboriginal communities. Analysis of TPA-related Aboriginal issues requires a 
culturally-informed understanding of why Aboriginal people may continue to 
participate in relationships that have the potential to be exploitative. A culturally 
informed understanding of how Aboriginal businesses operate may suggest that 
they are as concerned with cultural reproduction as financial viability. However, 
the fact that businesses operate in the Aboriginal domain and are informed by 
specific Aboriginal economic practices does not necessarily mean that they do not 
operate in a competitive and efficient manner. In some instances it may be that 
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the cultural context of a business is an important asset as, for example, in 
Aboriginal art production or tourism.  
Aboriginal consumers and the market 
One specific aim of this research is to identify special characteristics of Aboriginal 
communities that make individuals susceptible to commercial exploitation, and 
that should be taken into account in any ACCC compliance or education 
strategies. This section draws on findings from ethnographic studies of remote 
Aboriginal groups to outline certain values and practices which Aboriginal people 
in such areas typically bring to bear on their transactions in the market. A case 
study of the operations of a remote pastoral station store is used to argue that 
certain transactions may be both commercially exploitative and instances of 
instrumental Aboriginal action, or agency. The implications of this argument for 
the ACCC’s compliance and education strategies are discussed in the final part of 
this paper. 
The ‘informed consumer’ 
The underlying principles of the TPA are predicated upon the assumption that a 
competitive market will benefit consumers in most instances.1 This is reflected in 
the Act’s stated objective of enhancing the welfare of Australians through 
promoting competition and fair trading and providing consumer protection. 
Markets involve producers of goods and services, consumers of those goods and 
services, and intermediaries such as wholesalers and retailers. Bruce suggests, in 
a summary of the operations of the consumer protection aspects of the TPA, that 
there is a tension between producers of goods and services and consumers. He 
argues that: 
[t]he tension exists because the producers generally want to make the goods or 
services at the cheapest cost to themselves and make the best possible price return 
on those products. Consumers on the other hand generally want to choose between 
as many goods or services as they can and to buy them at the cheapest possible 
price to themselves. 
The indication of this tension is price. Consumers use their buying power to send 
signals to producers telling them what goods or services they think are worth 
spending money on. In response to these price signals, producers then alter their 
production process to put out the kinds of goods and services that consumers are 
willing to pay for (1999: 4). 
Thus a properly functioning market requires not only competition between 
producers and between suppliers, but also consumers for whom information 
about price is one of the bases upon which purchasing behaviour is predicated. 
Ultimately, then, certain assumptions are being made about human nature, or at 
least about those aspects of it that pertain to the provision and obtaining of 
market-derived goods. 
This part of the paper does not argue that price is irrelevant to the purchasing 
decisions of Aboriginal people in remote regions. However, it does suggest that it 
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is not enough to understand their typically vulnerable economic position solely in 
terms of structural features of the market in remote regions, or poor literacy and 
numeracy skills, or a lack of knowledge of their consumer rights—although these 
factors are demonstrably present. Rather, it argues that Aboriginal people also 
bring to their dealings with the market particular distinctive values and practices. 
That is, the reality of Aboriginal agency has to be accepted in any analysis of 
competition and consumer issues.  
Put another way, it is argued here that Aboriginal people are ‘informed 
consumers’, but typically much of the knowledge and many of the values which 
inform their purchases of goods and services may be quite different from those of 
non-Aboriginal consumers. While the focus here is on remote areas, there is also 
a body of ethnographic evidence which suggests that distinctive Aboriginal values 
and practices are not solely confined to traditionally-oriented populations in 
remote areas.  
Cash and consumer goods 
In a market economy such as Australia’s, money integrates otherwise disparate 
processes in a multitude of domains. It not only mediates but serves to represent 
relations between objects, and to objectify relations between persons. However, 
within the Aboriginal domain in remote Australia at least, money’s capacity to 
objectify relations in this manner is greatly attenuated, through what Sansom 
(1988) in writing of Darwin Aboriginal fringe dwellers, aptly terms a resistance to 
the ‘monetisation of the mind’.  
For such Aboriginal people, whether or not cash is exchanged for access to others’ 
consumer goods, services or labour, and the amounts of cash involved in the 
transactions, are dependent upon people’s own assessments of the social value 
and context of the proposed transaction, rather than its formal economic value. 
As one instance, a number of attempts have been made in past years by Wik 
individuals and families in Aurukun in western Cape York to start small 
enterprises, for example through selling candy, soft drinks and cigarettes. In all 
cases these failed. The common factor was that the cash generated from sales was 
insufficient to meet the costs of the goods to the enterprise, and the overwhelming 
reason for this was that it was not possible for those operating the enterprises to 
insist that goods provided or booked down to kin be paid for.  
As another example from the same region, whether money is offered, and how 
much, for the use of another person’s vehicle or a boat for a hunting trip can 
depend on a range of non-market factors (Martin 1993: 116–29). These include 
the relationship between the parties (with the expectation and amount of payment 
tending to increase with the social and kinship distance of the relationship), the 
relative status of the two parties (particularly as established through kinship), 
whether the vehicle or boat owner has social or other debts owing to the other 
party, and the amount of cash currently held by the person seeking the transport. 
These exchanges of cash between individuals and groups, and the use of 
consumer goods such as vehicles and boats, serve in part to establish and 
reproduce the system of Aboriginal social relations, especially those relationships 
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defined through kinship. This social phenomenon is widely reported in the 
literature for Australian Aboriginal groups (e.g. Macdonald 2000; Martin 1995; 
Peterson 1991; Sansom 1980). 
In such systems, money is no longer the object of formal calculation governed by 
the impersonal principles of the market place. On the contrary, it is transformed 
within the Aboriginal domain, becoming more the subject of contingent social 
calculation—what Schwab (1995) has aptly termed a ‘social calculus’—and a 
means through which a distinctive order is stamped upon the world. This 
‘cultural logic’ not only operates within the Aboriginal domain, but is brought to 
bear by Aboriginal people in their dealings with outsiders.  
Similar principles operate with regard to consumer goods. For example, Gerrard 
(1989) provides an analysis of the role of motor vehicles in an Arnhem Land 
community in the flows of goods and services among kin, and between Aboriginal 
people and outsiders, through a process of ‘humbugging’ or demand sharing (see 
below). The assimilation of vehicles to distinctive Aboriginal modes of economy 
and sociality amongst Warlpiri people of the central desert region has been 
clearly, and wittily, shown in the Bush Mechanics documentary series, screened 
by the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC 2000). These films show that 
vehicles are without doubt of high social utility, and are purchased from dealers 
in Alice Springs through market transactions. However, the value Warlpiri men 
accord them is not constructed against that established by the regional used-car 
market, but in terms of their roles in primarily Aboriginal masculine pursuits 
such as hunting, attendance at ceremonies, and visiting kin across a huge region. 
Furthermore, ‘ownership’ and use of a vehicle is not confined to a single 
individual or family, even if they were the original purchasers. Rather, vehicles 
provide focal points around which important aspects of Warlpiri sociality are 
organised. That is, for Warlpiri people, the value of vehicles is primarily socially 
determined within the regional Aboriginal society, rather than commercially 
determined within the regional, or national, market.  
Conversely, there is ethnographic evidence that where possession of consumer 
goods, even highly valued ones, adversely impacts on core Aboriginal values, 
steps may be taken to ensure the primacy of the latter. Martin (1993) notes 
instances among the Wik people of western Cape York Peninsula where vehicles 
and other consumer goods are deliberately damaged or destroyed as part of an 
omnipresent pressure against material and capital accumulation and its potential 
to establish hierarchies. Similarly, Folds (2001) records instances of video 
recorders and other such consumer goods being destroyed by their owners to 
prevent disputation over their use amongst Pintupi people of the Western Desert. 
Despite the availability of cash and consumer goods on a hitherto unprecedented 
scale, the evidence demonstrates that wealth for the Aboriginal people of such 
regions continues to lie primarily in social forms of capital. This is especially the 
case with social connections defined through kin and section relationships, and 
cultural forms of capital, such as connections to traditional country, and ritual 
status and knowledge. Ultimately that which is accumulated, managed and 
contested in the Aboriginal domain is not material forms of capital so much as 
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social capital (Martin 1995). Cash and consumer goods have become incorporated 
into the Aboriginal domain as core means through which particular forms of 
social capital can be realised. The values and practices which inform that domain 
are brought to bear in Aboriginal people’s transactions in the market. The paper 
now briefly turns to explore this issue. 
Seeking dependency 
Particular concerns may arise in situations where there is a high degree of 
inequality between the transactors in a market. This will often be the case for 
Aboriginal consumers from remote communities, who may have a poor command 
of English, be largely illiterate and innumerate, and live in relatively impoverished 
circumstances. In these cases, the Aboriginal consumer may be dependent upon 
the knowledge, skills, honesty and goodwill of the provider of the particular good 
or service. These relationships may be long-term, for example between the owners 
and customers of the pastoral station store discussed below. However, it can not 
be assumed that such dependency flows solely from the relative inequality in 
market-relevant skills, knowledge and competence between Aboriginal people and 
the providers of goods and services. On the contrary, and paradoxically, 
dependency may itself arise in part at least through Aboriginal agency. 
There is a significant body of research which suggests that ‘dependency’, in terms 
of a culturally established and validated capacity to demand and receive 
resources and services from others, is a core principle through which Aboriginal 
agency is realised in the structuring of social and economic relationships. This 
principle operates both within contemporary Aboriginal groups and in the 
intercultural zone between them and the wider society (see discussions in 
Anderson 1983, 1988a; Finlayson 1991; Martin 1993, 1995; Myers 1986; 
Peterson 1993; Sansom 1980, 1988; Schwab 1995; Trigger 1992). Objective 
disparities in power and wealth can be transformed by such Aboriginal agency 
through a process of co-opting others, often outsiders (including non-Aboriginal 
people) to become patrons or ‘bosses’. 
Personalising ‘market’ transactions 
It has been suggested that within the Aboriginal domain money is, in a sense, 
personalised. Equivalently, Aboriginal people will actively strategise to incorporate 
outsiders—taxi drivers, store managers, agency staff working in communities and 
so on—into the world of Aboriginal ‘performative sociality’ (Martin 1993). By this 
is meant a social universe in which relatedness is established through the flows of 
cash, goods and services between people, and in which Aboriginal people actively 
resist confining social relationships (including those with outsiders) to the terms 
of their formal institutional roles.  
For the Wik people of western Cape York Peninsula, for example, the term 
‘customer’ does not refer to the market-based relationship of the purchaser of 
goods or services, but to individuals in dyadic and personalised partnerships 
involving exchanges of cash such as loans and gambling stakes. Reciprocity and 
public sociability between the partners are both essential elements. Suggestively, 
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both partners in the relationship refer to each other as ‘customers’ (Martin 1993, 
1995). 
By incorporating significant others into their system of social relations, Aboriginal 
people are attempting to subject them to their own system of obligations 
constructed in terms of flows of goods and services. Thus, for example, by 
establishing personalised relationships with a pastoral store manager, or a taxi 
driver in Alice Springs, an Aboriginal person can (from his or her own cultural 
logic) offer patronage, respect and amicable relations, and in return gain access to 
goods, services and credit (through book-up). 
A primary mechanism through which the flow of goods and services is realised is 
what anthropologists (following Peterson 1993) have termed ‘demand sharing’, 
and which Aboriginal people in central Australia call ‘humbugging’. Much 
Aboriginal social transaction (particularly that involving access to material 
resources such as the use of vehicles, food, tobacco, alcohol and cash) arises as 
the result of demanding rather than of sharing. In demanding, an individual is 
asserting their personal right (as a son, an aunt, a clansman and so forth) to a 
response from others, but is also acknowledging, and thus through their actions 
substantiating, their relationship with the other person (Martin 1995; 
Musharbash 2000; Schwab 1995).  
Such demanding is not confined within the Aboriginal domain. One of the social 
phenomena which non-Aboriginal staff in remote Aboriginal Australia find the 
most difficult to deal with is the constant demands for access to resources such 
as the use of vehicles, cash ‘loans’, booking down, and so forth. There is 
considerable ethnography on this dynamic (e.g. Gerrard 1989; Martin 1995; 
Musharbash 2000; Peterson 1993; Sansom 1980; Schwab 1995), but for the 
purposes of this paper it suffices to say that ‘humbugging’ does not just represent 
the incapacity of the Aboriginal individual to manage his or her financial affairs, 
nor does it reflect an uninhibited desire for material goods as such. Rather, it 
demonstrates a process through which access to valued resources is established 
through a particular form of Aboriginal instrumental action where relationships 
are constructed in personal, rather than market-based terms. 
The implications of these arguments can be illustrated in a case study involving a 
store run by a pastoralist in a remote location in the Northern Territory. 
Case study: a remote pastoral station store 
Small stores are operated by pastoralists in many areas of the Northern Territory. 
In some cases, these stores service permanent Aboriginal populations living on 
excisions within the station. In others, they provide competition to stores on 
major Aboriginal communities in their region. While many pastoral stores focus 
on Aboriginal customers, others also target the passing tourist trade. 
A station store that services only the employees of the pastoralist falls under the 
definition of ‘pastoral purposes’ as defined in the Pastoral Land Act 1992 (NT). On 
the other hand, a store constructed on a main road with the intent of capturing 
passing trade does not fall within the definition of ‘pastoral purposes’. Under s. 86 
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of the Pastoral Land Act, a pastoral lessee who wishes to use part of the lease for 
a non-pastoral purpose may apply to the Pastoral Land Board for permission to 
do so. Once a store becomes a successful stand-alone commercial enterprise, it is 
expected that the pastoralist will apply to excise land from the lease as an 
alternative tenure, a term Crown lease with a right to freehold upon completion of 
development. An application for such an excision can be made by a third party, 
with consent of the pastoral lessee. Relevant future act provisions of the Native 
Title Act 1993 (Cth) have to be followed. 
Information from the Northern Territory Cattlemen’s Association (B. Lee, pers. 
comm.), suggests that permission to establish a store, as a non-pastoral purpose, 
is not always formally sought. In any event, in contrast to the situation on 
Aboriginal lands held under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 
1976 (Cth) (ALRA), the legislation as such does not appear to raise structural 
impediments to the establishment of small retail operations on pastoral lease 
lands. 
The following case study concerns a pastoral store in a remote area of the 
Northern Territory. A pastoralist and his family supplement their income from 
their pastoral enterprise in relatively marginal cattle country, through operating a 
store alongside the gravel road running past their homestead. They have 
established a reasonably well–stocked store in quite substantial premises. The 
store provides an income for the pastoralist without which, he stated, the viability 
of his overall operation would be compromised. Almost all the trade at this store 
involves Aboriginal customers. No Aboriginal people live on the freehold land 
where the store is located, so Aboriginal people are travelling from three or four 
major communities (with stores) located within a radius of several hundred 
kilometres, with some customers travelling from outside the Northern Territory. 
This prompts the question: why are Aboriginal people prepared to travel such long 
distances to use the store? 
At the time of our visit, no prices were marked, either on the goods themselves or 
on the shelves. The store operated an EFTPOS system through the till, and we 
observed that a significant number of keycards were held behind the counter. We 
were also advised that the store held PIN numbers for some of the cards. The 
store manager readily acknowledged that this created considerable potential for 
exploitation, and that the probity of the system depended upon the honesty of 
himself and his family. The store also operated a book-up system, with a sliding 
scale of charges according to the amount purchased on credit. A sign above the 
till stated the charge as $9 up to $50 credit, $11 up to $100 credit, and thereafter 
$9 for each additional $100 credit.2 
Certain of these practices would seem to be undesirable, and some may even fall 
under the ‘unconscionable conduct’ provisions of the TPA. Bruce (1999: 28) has 
identified two themes underlying case law on the unconscionable conduct 
provisions of the TPA: 
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• an unequal relationship exists in the sense that one of the parties is under a 
special disability by virtue of age, infirmity, illiteracy or lack of education; 
and 
• the stronger party is aware of the disability and then exploits it to his or her 
advantage. 
It could be argued that these elements are present in the situation outlined 
above. However, there is another set of factors in this complex situation, which 
relate to the question of Aboriginal agency; that is, the instrumental actions of 
Aboriginal people in accordance with particular values and understandings.  
The store does not have a captive market. All consumers travel large distances to 
use the store and, further, this store is competing with the larger ones operating 
at all of the communities from which its customers come. Far from being a 
disincentive for reasons of high fuel costs and the time involved, travel itself can 
involve other valued activities such as visiting country, hunting, and maintaining 
contact with relatives over an extended region. Also, people can exercise some 
choice as to who travels with them to the pastoral store, and thus reduce the 
demands from relations on their cash while actually shopping (see also 
Musharbash 2000: 59–60). By leaving their keycards with the storekeeper, 
Aboriginal people can avoid the all-pervasive ‘humbugging’ for cash from 
relations, particularly on those days when wages or pensions are known to be 
deposited electronically into accounts, and they may also accumulate savings. 
The store’s customers are thus clearly exercising choice.  
Furthermore, this particular pastoralist has lived in the area for some fourteen 
years, and knows most Aboriginal people of the region by name. While pragmatic 
in his attitudes, he also appeared to demonstrate knowledge of, and respect 
towards, particular distinct Aboriginal values and practices; for example, by his 
own acount, he took active steps to protect Aboriginal people passing through on 
ceremonial business from unwanted scrutiny by outsiders. 
It transpired that there were no Aboriginal customers at the store at the time of 
our field visit, and so it was not possible to ascertain directly their own views of 
the situation. Nonetheless, it would be reasonable to assume, on the evidence 
available to us, that Aboriginal customers have established a particular form of 
mutuality with the storekeeper and his family, in which they structure certain of 
their financial and purchasing dealings through personalised rather than market-
derived relationships. The store therefore arguably operates in a complex 
‘intercultural space’ (Merlan 1998), in which both Aboriginal agency and (possibly) 
undesirable or even unconscionable sales practices are features. 
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Factors of relevance to the operation of competitive markets 
in remote Aboriginal communities 
The purpose of the TPA is to enhance ‘the welfare of Australians through the 
promotion of competition and fair trading and provision of consumer protection’ 
(s. 2 TPA). Competition can be defined as the pressure that firms exert on each 
other when acting independently to achieve the maximum amount of profit. The 
degree of actual or potential competition in a market determines the market 
power of firms.3 Corones (1999: 85) notes that ‘[m]arket power, whether 
possessed by a single firm or firms acting collectively, is a measure of the ability 
of firms to harm consumers through excessive prices, inferior products and poor 
service’. Thus a market may be non-competitive if there are only one or two firms 
in the market such that each can exercise a large degree of market power. In 
addition, barriers to entry to the market will also restrict competition. These may 
include legislative barriers that place restrictions on entry into the market, and 
structural barriers such as the high start-up costs of entry. Finally, differential 
access to information on the part of the buyer and seller of a good in a market, 
termed ‘asymmetries of information’, can also result in markets operating non-
competitively. 
In standard economic theory, a number of benefits flow to consumers in a market 
which is competitive. Competitive markets are viewed as efficient ‘in terms of 
producing goods and services at the lowest average cost of production and 
producing the goods and services that consumers value the most’ (Corones 1999: 
5). Recognising the benefits that flow to consumers in a competitive market, the 
TPA includes a number of provisions designed to promote competition (in 
particular Pt IV s. 45–50). Acquiring market power is not illegal in itself, but 
misuse of market power for anti-competitive purposes is (s. 46). However, the 
ACCC may authorise conduct which may otherwise breach its anti-competitive 
provisions on the basis that it is of public benefit (under s. 88).  
One aim of this research is to identify special characteristics of Aboriginal 
communities which inhibit competitive processes from delivering benefits enjoyed 
by other communities (market failure), and which should be taken into account in 
ACCC compliance or education strategies. As the key enterprises in remote 
Aboriginal communities, community stores provide an excellent case study for 
examining the operation of competitive markets. Factors that have been identified 
as barriers to the operation of competitive markets in remote Aboriginal 
communities, as exemplified by community stores, are:  
• structural impediments, and in particular high transport costs;  
• the limited number of stores in remote areas in general, and Aboriginal 
communities in particular; 
• problems of governance which prevent the efficient operation of stores and 
may also operate as a barrier to the entry of new stores;  
• the cultural context of community stores (see Altman, McDonnell & Ward 
2001); 
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• high labour costs in remote communities; and 
• land rights legislation which may also operate as a barrier to entry of firms 
onto Aboriginal land.  
The following section will discuss each of these factors in general terms, before 
focusing on the fieldwork conducted on remote Aboriginal community stores. 
The market power of community stores 
The higher prices charged for goods in some community stores could be indicative 
of a number of factors.4 It could be that higher prices reflect structural 
impediments or other problems in the operation of stores (discussed below), but it 
is equally possible that they reflect, at least in part, the market power of 
community stores. While higher prices are not, in and of themselves, a breach of 
the TPA, abuse of market power is (in accordance with Part IV s. 46).  
Most community stores have a high degree of market power either as the only 
provider, or as one of a few providers of goods to their community. Even where 
there is more than one store in a community they are not necessarily acting as 
competitors. For example, in Yuendumu there are two stores. Food and goods are 
purchased mainly from the larger community store. Another, much smaller, 
corner store also provides some food and a limited number of goods. Competition 
between the two stores is minimal. While the smaller corner store has seen an 
increase in demand for its goods, mainly because its prices are lower than the 
larger community store, its small physical and stock-handling capacity mean that 
it is unable to meet the needs of a population of some 800 people. Moreover, 
fieldwork indicated that even where there are two stores operating, agreements 
may be made between them so that they do not operate in direct competition with 
each other over certain products. Thus, for example, in one community there is 
an understanding between store managements that one store will handle sporting 
goods, shoes and clothes, while the other will handle petrol and stock goods for 
tourists. While this may not be an explicit ‘arrangement’ it may lead to a lessening 
of competition in markets for certain products and as such it may be considered 
an ‘understanding’ which contravenes s. 45 of the TPA. On the other hand, it may 
be argued that in situations where (as is typically the case) community stores 
have a limited operating capital base, certain public benefits may be served by 
ensuring competition in the supply of essential items such as foodstuffs, and 
limiting it in relation to other non-essential goods. This will particularly be the 
case where the curtailment of such arrangements would result in the closure of 
one store, leaving a monopoly. 
Market power is also defined in terms of access to other markets, both spatially 
and over time (Australian Meat Holdings v TPC; Re Queensland Co-operative 
Milling Association Ltd; Re Defiance Holdings Ltd). In terms of the TPA definition of 
a market, the geographic scope of a market takes into account whether 
consumers can access another market. For example, the distance to the next 
store would be a relevant factor. If a community store is the only store within a 
500-kilometre radius, access to other stores is unlikely to be a constraint on its 
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market power. Sheer distance confers a monopoly; without access to other 
markets a population will become dependent on purchasing goods from the 
community store. Monopoly in its turn allows the charging of high prices, some 
component of which may also reflect the increased transport costs associated 
with distance from major centres.  
The limited access of remote Aboriginal communities to markets is also seasonally 
dictated: this is a temporal dimension of market power. For example, Yuendumu, 
Maningrida, Ntaria and Aurukun are all isolated by flooding at certain times of 
the year, so that basic goods either have to be flown in or, for the coastal 
communities, brought by barge. Thus stores in most of these markets operate as 
the only providers of goods for certain times of the year. 
The market power of community stores is also indicated the dependence of 
certain sections of the community on goods provided by the them, particularly the 
elderly and those with limited access to transport. For those groups the 
community store becomes an essential provider of basic goods including food, 
water, clothes and blankets. They constitute, in effect, a captive market. The 
failure of the community store to meet these basic needs, as well as increased 
prices on basic foodstuffs, can impact seriously on vulnerable sections of the 
community.5  
Aboriginal people in remote Aboriginal communities appear to be more dependent 
on community stores than local non-Aboriginal people. Interviews conducted 
during the fieldwork indicate that non-Aboriginal people, with their generally 
higher socioeconomic status, can afford to order food and goods directly from 
distant service centres, and have them freighted or flown in. This practice is noted 
by Altman (2001) in Maningrida, where local non-Aboriginal residents often buy 
items from Darwin and have them delivered by air or barge. Finlayson (1997: 11) 
notes that in one remote Queensland community, ‘[i]nstead of shopping locally on 
a needs basis, each [non-Aboriginal] household organises a three-month “bush 
order” of fresh fruit, vegetables and meat, together with dry goods to be delivered 
by barge from a regional centre’. One of the reasons that non-Aboriginal people 
are able to shop in such large amounts while Aboriginal people tend not to is that: 
[a]ll non-indigenous houses had domestic freezers … By contrast, few Aboriginal 
houses had refrigerators, let alone freezers and most domestic cooking was replaced 
by daily buying of food from the community ‘take away’ (1997: 11–12). 
Based on her research Finlayson concludes that: 
almost without exception, no non-Aboriginal staff shop at the community store … In 
this way they were able to avoid the high prices and questionable quality of goods in 
the community store (1997: 11). 
Access to transport is another reason that non-Aboriginal people may be less 
dependent on community stores than the Aboriginal population in remote 
communities. Most non-Aboriginal people in communities either have their own 
car, or have access to a car by way of their occupation. This allows them to visit 
other stores within a region, as well as the regional service centre. For Aboriginal 
people connections with non-Aboriginal locals, and particularly those with access 
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to a car, becomes an important resource. There are non-Aboriginal service staff 
who make frequent visits between service centres and remote communities, and 
non-Aboriginal residents of communities can, and often do, take advantage of 
this. For example, a non-Aboriginal woman employed in the medical centre in 
Yuendumu made the comment that she often asked colleagues coming from Alice 
Springs to pick up pre-ordered packages of groceries for her.  
Demand inelasticity 
One indicator of the dependence of the community, and in particular certain 
sections of the community, on goods provided by stores can be seen in the 
inelasticity of demand for some items. If demand for a good is inelastic then 
increases in the price of a good will not proportionally affect the quantity of the 
good that is demanded. For example general consumer demand for cigarettes is 
relatively inelastic. A large body of anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that 
Aboriginal demand for some items may be relatively inelastic (see Martin 1993, 
1998). For example, Wells quotes McMillan, the director of the Arnhem Land 
Progress Association (ALPA) between 1988 and 1992, as saying: 
The Aboriginal customer will pay almost anything for something they want. 
Conversely if they do not want something you cannot give it away. A recent example 
in one of our shops was a table of dresses to clear at $2.00 each, without one sale—
this would never happen in the urban centres of Australia (1993: 160). 
During interviews a number of store managers commented on the relatively 
inelastic demand for certain items. For example, store managers at Yuelamu 
described the demand for ‘mink blankets’ as so great that they ‘could charge 
anything’ for them. Part of the reason that demand is so high is that in addition 
to their obvious uses, in many Aboriginal communities around central Australia 
blankets have an important ceremonial role in ‘sorry business’.  
Inelastic demand for certain items may make the Aboriginal populations of remote 
communities vulnerable to price exploitation. This vulnerability is compounded by 
low levels of literacy, which lead to dependence on the pictorial, brand-label 
representation of certain goods. McMillan notes that: 
Brand loyalty is very high, but this is probably a reflection of literacy levels rather 
than product preference. If tea comes in a blue packet you don’t buy it in a yellow 
one. The fact that one is Bushells and one Liptons is beside the point (1991: 283). 
During interviews a number of store managers detailed experiences of products 
no longer selling because companies changed their packaging. They also 
considered that Aboriginal customers were less likely to buy the generic brands of 
some products because of loyalty to particular brands, an experience supported 
by McMillan (1991: 283) who states that, ‘[l]iteracy and product recognition by 
colour limit [ALPA’s] ability to market generic house brands’. 
McMillan’s ALPA experience suggests that the relative inelasticity of demand for 
some items may mean that Aboriginal people could fall prey to exploitative pricing 
on some goods (McMillan 1991). Advertising may in some cases reinforce brand 
loyalty; Wells (1993) expresses the view that people respond quickly to advertising 
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for particular products. Advertising seems particularly evident in Aboriginal 
consumers’ preference for brand name items. During fieldwork it became 
apparent that many Aboriginal consumers, like consumers generally, were 
particularly attracted to ‘high status’ brand names. Brand-named clothes such as 
Nike and Adidas are popular amongst young people as well as clothes that depict 
black stars (like the rap artist Tupac). Amongst older men Levi jeans, RM Williams 
boots, Moleskin pants and Akubra hats are popular. While these clothes were 
relatively expensive, given people’s generally small incomes, other non-brand 
clothes were seen as markedly inferior or ‘rubbish’ clothes.  
Structural impediments to competition 
The key question is whether the higher prices charged in community stores are 
indicative of structural impediments rather than a reflection of market power. The 
primary reason given in the literature for the failure of markets to operate 
competitively in remote communities is the role played by structural 
impediments. For example, the high prices found in remote community stores are 
often attributed to high transportation costs. Another impediment identified in 
the literature is the small populations of many isolated Aboriginal communities 
and associated diseconomies of scale (Legislative Assembly of the Northern 
Territory 1999).  
There are obvious links between high transport costs and a lack of competition in 
transport services to rural and remote communities. Young argues that:  
On the whole store managers have little chance of reducing their freight costs by 
bargaining with rival firms because few operators serve their region. On the 
contrary, managers may have to go to some length to persuade carriers to come out 
to them, and may have to accept terms with little argument (1984: 44).  
During fieldwork most store managers indicated that they were dependent on a 
single transport provider, and this is suggestive of an uncompetitive freight 
market. By contrast, competition among transport providers clearly has a positive 
impact on the cost of freight. Recent fieldwork conducted by Altman (2001) 
suggests that the increase from one to two barge operators to Maningrida, has 
fostered a higher level of competition and resulted in lower transport costs and 
cheaper prices in Maningrida’s community stores. 
Data collected during fieldwork suggests that while transport costs may be an 
impediment to the efficient operation of community stores it is not particularly 
significant. A more important impediment may be the governance structures of 
stores (discussed in greater detail below). The importance of governance, as 
opposed to transport, to the efficient operation of community stores is evident in 
data which details the cost structure of community stores handled by Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu (henceforth Deloittes) in Alice Springs. In the years 1995 and 
1998 Deloittes provided accountancy services for 11 stores, and by 2000 this 
number had increased to 15. The information detailed by Deloittes represents a 
benchmark, or average, cost structure for all community stores handled by 
Deloittes in central Australia.  
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According to Deloittes the average community store operates on a cost structure 
that is only nominally profitable (see Table 1). For example, in 2000, community 
stores in the Deloittes sample with an average turnover of $1,038,619 returned a 
net profit of only 3.5 per cent. In addition, while the expected gross profit for 
businesses is usually one-third of turnover (or 33 per cent), the community stores 
in the Deloittes sample recorded a gross profit of between 29.8 per cent (in 1998) 
and 30.5 per cent (in 1995). The Deloittes accountants attributed this to 
managers who failed to process or receipt goods that had been taken from the 
store, unrecorded stock spoilage, and the provision of loans to community store 
committee members. 
Between 1995 and 2000 freight charges accounted for between 2.3 per cent and 
3.8 per cent of costs relative to annual turnover. Store managers interviewed 
during fieldwork estimated the cost of freight at between 2 and 5 per cent of 
annual turnover. This can be contrasted to the mark-up policy detailed to us by 
store managers and accountants of community stores, who indicated that most 
stores mark up the price of goods by between 60 and 100 per cent, depending on 
the type of good. This policy seems to indicate that the costs of freight are 
minimal in the overall cost structure of most stores and do not seem to justify the 
generally high prices that are found.  
Store governance 
In the context of this paper, ‘governance’ refers to the processes and structures 
through which communities and organisations are controlled and directed, and 
necessarily involves questions of power, influence, and accountability. There are 
two levels at which governance is relevant to this study. The first is the wider 
structural level, as mediated through statutory regimes and institutions such the 
ALRA (see discussion below), and the Aboriginal community government system 
established under Part V of the Local Government Act 1993 (NT). The second is at 
the level of the stores themselves.  
Governance has long been identified as an issue of importance in relation to 
community stores (see for example the Legislative Assembly of the Northern 
Territory’s Inquiry into food prices 1999; George 1996; Young 1988, Young et al. 
1993). Community stores are typically operated by incorporated associations with 
Aboriginal boards (referred to as ‘store committees’). A study of remote stores 
conducted by the Territory  Health Services (THS) of the Northern Territory (2000) 
shows that the majority (66%) of surveyed stores were owned either through 
community-based associations or through other forms of Aboriginal corporation 
(see Table 2). In addition, community stores are often under Aboriginal 
management to some degree. Table 2 indicates that of the stores surveyed nearly 
half (48%) had a store committee.  
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Table 1. Average cost structure of remote central Australian Aboriginal 
community stores 1995, 1998, 2000 
 1995 1998 2000 
Account Av. ($) Av. (%) Av. ($) Av. (%) Av. ($) Av. (%) 
Sales 1099427 100.0 1051392 100.0 1038619 100.0 
Cost of sales  
(excluding freight) 
 
764063 
 
69.5 
 
737958 
 
70.2 724785
 
69.8 
Gross profit 335364 30.5 313435 29.8 313835 30.2 
Other income 
Interest received 2164 0.2 2680 0.3 2332 0.2 
Other income 38056 3.5 6380 0.6 4654 0.4 
Expenses 
Admin. fees 964 0.1 266 0.0 140 0.1
Advertising 404 0.0 240 0.0 69 0.0
Audit & accounting 14652 1.3 15394 1.5 15004 1.3
Bad debts 3218 0.3 2956 0.3 6721 0.3
Bank charges 2373 0.2 3727 0.4 3307 0.2
Committee costs 1485 0.1 1659 0.2 1157 0.1
Depreciation 24294 2.2 36272 3.4 35056 2.2
Distributions & 
donations 38580 3.5 16788
 
1.6 14686 1.4
Electr., gas & water 13901 1.3 15914 1.5 14147 1.3
Freight 42228 3.8 24165 2.3 42228 3.8
Insurance 8113 0.7 8033 0.8 7403 0.7
Interest 2476 0.2 352 0.0 625 0.2
Legal costs 934 0.1 192 0.0 34 0.1
Manager’s expenses 5789 0.5 731 0.1 2315 0.5
Recruitment 375 0.0 - - 553 0.0
R & M 19014 1.7 12030 1.1 10790 1.7
Security 1031 0.1 556 0.1 342 0.1
Staff amenities 895 0.1 899 0.1 2088 0.1
Stock written off 2535 0.2 2288 0.2 4830 0.2
Superannuation 3683 0.3 6459 0.6 8072 0.3
Telephone, fax 4740 0.4 3494 0.3 4903 0.4
Travel & accomm. 2874 0.3 3662 0.3 4443 0.3
Wages & salaries 131644 12.0 123548 11.8 131491 12.0
Other expenses 12031 1.4 18227 1.5 27176 1.4
Total expenses 337300 30.7 293958 28.0 305343 30.7 
Net profit 38284 3.5 28537 2.7 15478 3.5 
Source: Data supplied by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu in 2001. 
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Table 2. Ownership and management structure of remote stores in the 
Northern Territory, 2000 
District  
Darwin  
 
Katherine 
East 
Arnhem 
Alice 
Springs  
 
Barkly  
Total no. 
of stores 
Ownership       
Community owned 9 10 3 4 2 28 
Privately owned/leased 1 10 0 1 6 18 
Aboriginal corporation 4 1 3 0 1 9 
Not stated    1  1 
Management        
Store committee 10 9 4 3 1 27 
Total stores surveyed 14 21 6 6 9 56 
Source: THS 2000. 
While the corporate structure of most community stores seems to indicate that 
there is a high degree of Aboriginal management, in actuality community stores 
are often run by non-Aboriginal managers. Young et al. write that while the 
decisions relating to the five stores operated by ALPA were made, in theory, by an 
Aboriginal board of directors, in practice this was not the case: 
[i]n reality, technical matters such as those concerning stock ordering systems, 
dealing with the transport services … developing training curricula and the methods 
for delivering these, supervising the work of non-Aboriginal store managers and 
running the financial and accountancy services, are dealt with by the Executive 
Director and head office staff. Most of these are non-Aboriginal. Thus Aboriginal 
control in ALPA’s day-to-day operations … is limited (1993: 7). 
One of the reasons why Aboriginal community boards may fail to play a direct role 
in the day-to-day running of stores is that they lack the necessary skills. Young et 
al. write that the ‘Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal split in responsibility for policy and 
technical matters is unlikely to change until Aboriginal people have been given 
the opportunity to acquire the necessary technical skills’ (1993: 7). Technical 
skills are important to the legal operation of community stores, and there may be 
a role for the ACCC in educating store committees about the operation of the TPA 
(see below).  
Most community stores are operated by small corporations whose membership is 
drawn from the community, and whose boards (typically called ‘store committees’) 
are elected from that membership. While sound investment principles would 
suggest the need for substantial reinvestment of profits in the business, store 
committees are under considerable pressure to disburse the profits to community 
members. Whether or not the  community store profits are distributed, and to 
whom, is often a contentious issue in communities. The store committee’s 
difficulties in balancing cultural obligations with obligations to the wider 
community become evident. Wells (1993: 156) writes that ‘[t]he dispersal of store 
profits is probably one of the more problematical areas of store operation and 
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management’. In particular, this is a problem if large amounts of Aboriginal 
community members’ money goes into the store (as is inevitably the case), and 
this money is syphoned off to benefit only a few people. Wells writes: 
In many cases, the store is the only independent economic enterprise in the 
community and, because of this independence, can be used as a means to enhance 
the political status and power of a particular family, clan or individual within the 
community (1993: 157–8). 
Further, Wells adds that in this context: 
[i]t is fairly unrealistic to expect that any profit arising from the business will not be 
utilised by a small number of people (which is then distributed to their families) who 
feel that they have some ‘right’ to these resources (1993: 158).  
Other examples of the use of profits are community store-funded mini-buses or 
barges (see Povinelli 1993) and the use of profits to build a swimming pool or to 
fund other local infrastructure. Elsewhere, store profits are paid directly to 
community members as an annual dividend. For example the Yuelamu 
community store distributed $500 to every Aboriginal adult member of the store 
during the summer period, and $100 to every Aboriginal adult and child member 
of the Yuelamu community at Christmas. 
Dissent over distribution of profits, compounded by the high prices paid for food 
and goods, has led to some stores looking at alternative pricing models. For 
example, in 1992 the ALPA board of directors were presented with the option of 
lowering profits and reducing prices, rather than distributing profits to the 
various communities (Wells 1993: 170). A similar policy is currently being 
pursued by the community store in Mutitjulu. The Mutitjulu community owns 
and operates the highly profitable cultural centre enterprise located at Uluru 
(Ayres Rock). Recently the Mutitjulu Council has directed that profits from the 
cultural centre be used to cross-subsidise the price of goods in the community 
store. However, at present it is unclear how successful this strategy has been, 
with fieldwork indicating that many prices in the Mutitjulu community store 
remain higher than those in the supermarket located at the nearby Yulara Resort. 
One of the reasons that distribution of profits remains such a contentious issue 
in remote communities is that there is often little or no accountability by the 
manager to the store committee. In addition, there is often a lack of transparency 
in the way the store is operated. For example the store committee and the general 
community are often ignorant of the cost structure implemented or the profit 
made by the store. It may also be that some members of Aboriginal store 
committees receive money in the form of indefinite ‘loans’ from the manager. Thus 
a symbiotic relationship may arise between the store committee and the manager 
of the store, which benefits the few while resulting in increased prices for the 
many. Deloittes’ data (see Table 1) indicate that in 1995 the average amount of 
money paid by community stores in ‘distributions and donations’ was $38,500. 
However, between 1995 and 2000 there has been a decline in this amount, and it 
is possible that, with the increased accountability of stores associated with the 
introduction of the GST, payments in ‘distributions and donations’ may continue 
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to decline. Another cost related to store committees is ‘committee costs’ or sitting 
fees paid to members of the store committee, and ‘bad debts’. Deloittes’ data 
indicate that these costs are, however, quite nominal, amounting to an average 
cost of approximately $7,000 in 2000.  
The wages and salaries paid to the store manager and staff are also relevant to a 
discussion of governance. Under the kind of symbiotic relationship discussed 
above, store managers who have given a large number of ‘loans’ to committee 
members have leverage to ensure that they have generous terms detailed in their 
contracts. A lack of accountability and transparency in the operation of the store, 
when combined with a store committee whose members have a poor 
understanding of non-Aboriginal corporate governance requirements, can lead to 
confusion over the salaried amount actually paid to staff. For example, in an 
interview conducted during fieldwork, the chair of a store committee said that he 
had no idea what the manager of the store was being paid, or even if a contract 
between the store manager and committee existed. The manager has been 
working in the store with a large staff of non-Aboriginal people for almost two 
years, during which time all of the staff must have been paid. That the chair of 
the committee, as the employer of these staff, is unaware of the amounts they are 
being paid, is a demonstration of the stark contrast between the supposed legal 
corporate governance structure of store committees and the way that most 
operate in reality. 
Governance and ‘culture’ 
The difficulty of balancing Aboriginal cultural obligations with the legal 
obligations imposed under the general Australian legal system is a problem that 
plagues many store committees. One example, detailed above, is the problems 
encountered in the distribution of profits from community stores. Recognition of 
the need to balance Aboriginal cultural and non-Aboriginal legal obligations can 
be seen, for example, in the 1992 ALPA Annual Report which discusses the need 
to find an appropriate ‘culture’ in which ALPA stores can operate: 
We have now developed to a stage where it is difficult to decide whether ALPA is 
operated by ‘Balanda’ [white] culture or ‘Yolngu’ culture. There is no doubt in the 
minds of the directors and staff that ALPA is controlled by Aboriginal people for the 
benefit of Aboriginal people, and just who those people are. The dilemma comes 
when it is necessary to structure ALPA in a form that complies with Balanda law … 
One of the responsibilities we have as a board of directors is to work out a ‘Business 
culture’ that runs a business with balanda skills where necessary, but for the 
benefit of Yolngu people at all times … the struggle to find an authentic ALPA 
culture continues, and is a constant challenge before us (Rawnsley 1992). 
There are a number of reasons for the gulf between Aboriginal cultural and non-
Aboriginal understandings as to how stores should operate. First, the lack of 
accountability and transparency in the operation of many community stores 
poses a number of difficulties, as discussed above. Second, committees often do 
not understand their rights and responsibilities under non-Aboriginal law, in 
particular with respect to the accountability of store managers. Third, it appears 
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that often Aboriginal community members do not understand that they have 
rights as members of the corporation that operates the store.  
In theory, the corporate governance structures under which most community 
stores operate ensure that members could take action over the ineffectual 
management of a store. However, in reality, such action is unlikely to occur. Wells 
writes that most Aboriginal people consider the operation of the ALPA stores to be 
‘Balanda’ business over which they have no rights: ‘attempts to make community 
residents aware that they all, theoretically, control the Association and that ALPA 
is working for Aboriginal people have not been entirely successful’ (1993: 169). 
One reason for the lack of awareness about members’ rights may be that in the 
past many community stores were owned and controlled by non-Aboriginal people 
(Wells 1993: 169). As a result of this historical legacy: 
The store has always been seen as a European institution, and ownership groups 
continue to view it in that way, taking close notice of the ideas of European advisers 
who work with them (Young 1984: 73). 
Given this historical context it is not difficult to understand why many Aboriginal 
people feel that they lack rights in the control of the store. 
Aboriginal members of a community store may not feel entitled to exercise their 
members’ rights because, in terms of customary law, the rights of traditional 
owners (discussed below) should prevail. Often the latter are considered 
paramount in the operation of businesses in Aboriginal communities. Wells notes 
that: ‘there is a perception among Aboriginal people that they do not have a right 
to speak for or control resources, be it a store, land or another enterprise, if they 
do not have traditional rights/ownership to it’ (1993: 169). The governance 
structures of community stores may take account of these obligations to 
traditional owners by, for example, paying rent to them or appointing them to the 
store committee. However, recognition of these traditional owner’s rights may 
further confuse the issue of Aboriginal members’ rights.  
Finally, it may be that customary law concepts of access to knowledge also 
influence Aboriginal people’s understanding of who has rights in relation to 
community stores. Rights in Aboriginal society are often conferred on the basis of 
differential access to knowledge. Personal authority, the authority of elders and 
the integrity and autonomy of Aboriginal groups often depends on the control of 
land-related knowledge through restrictions on its dissemination (Bird Rose 1994: 
2). Thus in some communities it may be thought that people with control over 
stores have possession of certain knowledge that is not freely available to all. 
Wells writes that: 
there are particular ‘rights’ associated with having access to this [store] knowledge, 
to being employed in the store, to becoming a director … ultimately it is the ALPA 
Balanda hierarchy (which includes local store managers) who possess the most 
knowledge and therefore power. There is a perception among Aboriginal people that 
Balanda are hanging onto secret stories, that there is a ‘behind story’ which 
storeworkers and the community in general do not have access to (1993: 169). 
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Wells’ account is supported by Harper, as quoted by Wells, who states that: ‘there 
is a perception in the community that Yolngu do all the jobs but they don’t get the 
underneath knowledge’ (Wells 1993: 169). 
It may be that lack of access to ‘store knowledge’ causes Yolngu people to feel that 
they cannot control the store. The framing of ‘store knowledge’ as ‘restricted 
knowledge’, if Wells is correct in her analysis, suggests that Aboriginal members 
of ALPA neither understand their rights as members nor feel empowered enough 
to exercise those rights.  
The gulf between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal understandings may be framed in 
terms of the frontier economy. Located within the frontier economy, Aboriginal 
governance structures such as store committees and local councils have to 
balance the obligations imposed upon them by the two domains of which they 
form the intersection—the Aboriginal and the non-Aboriginal. They must thus 
meet the demands of their Aboriginal constituency—the community elders, 
traditional owners and their kin—and also those of the non-Aboriginal bodies to 
whom they are accountable—auditors and accountants and a variety of statutory 
agencies. While these obligations are not always conflicting, their import must be 
recognised before any changes can be made to the way store committees currently 
operate. 
Fig. 3. Aboriginal governance structures such as store committees 
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the more pressing problems of governance in community stores clearly lie outside 
the purview of the TPA, but unless the governance structures of community 
stores are improved, competition amongst stores cannot fully enhance consumer 
welfare. Well-run community stores can have a positive impact on pricing, but 
poorly managed and governed stores can result in consumers paying higher 
prices than they would otherwise.  
The socio-cultural context of stores 
The practices of community stores must thus be interpreted with reference to 
their cultural context. The continuing strength of Aboriginal social formations, 
and the values that underpin them such as the importance accorded to kinship, 
have led to a series of specifically Aboriginal economic practices. These values 
have far-reaching impacts on the ways in which individual and household 
expenditure, labour and business are viewed. In the Aboriginal domain the 
amount of money exchanged for consumer goods or labour is often not dependent 
on their economic value but rather on a contextual assessment of the social worth 
of the proposed transaction (see above). Thus Aboriginal communities may 
evaluate the success of a business less in terms of its commercial viability and 
more in terms of its ability to generate social capital by, for example, enhancing 
social and political relationships. Accordingly, resources are invested in 
enterprises that generate social rather than material capital. Aboriginal business 
enterprises which are interpreted as failing in commercial terms, may work to 
produce wealth in the form of social relationships and alliances (Martin 1995: 7–
17). 
The practice of demand sharing can also have a number of impacts on the 
operation of Aboriginal businesses. Pressure is placed on business owners to 
share not only their earnings but also any assets and equipment, such as cars, 
that the business might own.  
Demand sharing can also have implications for the Aboriginal staff working in 
businesses such as community stores. Young et al. write that:  
Aboriginal employees in stores can easily acquire the necessary technical skills but 
they have to be able to use these in a situation where they are frequently subjected 
to pressures of a more social nature. The difficulties which Aboriginal check-out 
operators in Australia face when confronted by relatives with supermarket trolleys 
filled with goods which they cannot afford to pay for is only one example of such 
pressures (1993: 8). 
A further example of pressure being placed on Aboriginal staff is offered by 
Ellanna et al.:  
Young women are particularly vulnerable in this way, both because of age and 
gender. Loss of stock in Aboriginal retail stores, where most check-out operators are 
young women, can be partly attributed to older men taking advantage of their 
powerful position in the community (1988: 60). 
A number of community stores have developed strategies for helping staff to deal 
with demand-sharing pressure. Wells (1993: 163) reports that ALPA has 
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developed a system, called ‘family law’, in which at the request of an Aboriginal 
staff member or manager the staff member is removed from the check-out and 
given other duties while their family is in the store. In addition, the presence of 
in-store video cameras which record check-out transactions, such as are found in 
the Maningrida stores, can stop pressure being placed on staff by family 
members. 
Aboriginal hierarchies of power and authority may at times conflict with the 
business hierarchy of the store, as when the authority held by elderly family 
members (and based on traditional knowledge) is used to over-rule the business 
decisions of younger, more commercially educated, kin (see Young 1988: 184–7). 
Ellanna et al. also refer to this type of conflict: 
[s]ince many of those involved in the financial and management sides of enterprise 
operation are younger, more highly educated members of the community it follows 
that their authority may frequently be over-ruled by their older kin, and they may 
feel obliged to hand on benefits to the detriment of the commercial side of the 
business (1988: 60). 
Conflicts affecting the practice of Aboriginal business can also arise from the 
relationships between individuals or groups and areas of land. The traditional 
owners of an area of land often have the responsibility and right to control activity 
within that area. In recognition of these rights the Aboriginal owners of the land 
that a business is located on often receive ‘royalty’ or ‘rent’ payments. This is an 
established practice particularly in the Northern Territory (and is discussed in 
greater detail below). 
Relationships to land are also significant in determining the appropriate 
management structures for businesses, not only in obvious examples such as 
cattle stations, but also for any enterprise located on Aboriginal land (Young 
1988: 184–7). In practice the result can be the domination of the business by 
land-owning groups, or the creation of irreconcilable conflicts that result in the 
replacement of Aboriginal business owners with non-Aboriginal operators 
(Peterson 1985: 90). 
Land rights legislation 
It can be argued that land rights legislation forms one, albeit not determinative, 
statutory barrier to the operation of fully competitive markets in remote 
Aboriginal communities. For example, in the Northern Territory many Aboriginal 
communities are located on Aboriginal land which is inalienable freehold title 
granted under the ALRA. The following discussion will concentrate on the ALRA, 
since it is currently the most extensive form of land rights accorded to Aboriginal 
people in Australia. Under s. 23 of the Act a land council must consult with 
traditional owners and other affected Aboriginal people before it can approve a 
grant of interest in Aboriginal land, including for the establishment of a business 
on Aboriginal land. This can be contrasted with the situation of pastoral station 
stores (detailed above), in which there seem to be few legislative barriers to the 
establishment of stores.  
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Land rights legislation may represent a significant legislative barrier to entry for 
certain types of business. In accordance with the Act, different legislative 
requirements must be met, dpepnding on the type of business. If the business 
involved requires simply entering Aboriginal land, as in the case of the sale of 
insurance premiums, then a permit to enter Aboriginal land will be required (see 
s. 70 ALRA). This permit requirement applies to all people visiting Aboriginal 
communities for work or any other purpose, on a short or long term basis 
(Central Land Council (CLC) 2001). Permits are provided through regional land 
councils which seek approval for permits from the community councils. 
Governance issues are thus significant in decisions about the granting of permits 
and leases. 
There have been cases in the Northern Territory where a community council, 
becoming dissatisfied with a store manager’s performance, has revoked that 
person’s permit and required them to leave Aboriginal land. During fieldwork a 
number of store managers expressed dissatisfaction at the uncertainty of working 
in an environment where they could be forced to leave in this way. The provisions 
of the ALRA may thus work to discourage good quality applicants from accepting 
employment in Aboriginal communities (but they may also work to discourage 
those who would seek to exploit Aboriginal communities).  
If the business involved requires a permanent location in a community then this 
will require that a lease be entered into with traditional owners (in accordance 
with s. 19 ALRA). Usually this lease will also include a provision for payment of 
rent to traditional owners whose land the business is located on. For example, 
Altman (2001) reports that in Maningrida both the Maningrida Progress 
Association and Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation stores pay rent to traditional 
owners via the Northern Land Council, in recognition of their location on 
Dekurdiji clan lands. Similarly, when the community store in Ntaria was built, 
the business entered into a contract for a 20-year lease, agreeing to pay rent to 
traditional owners. Rents paid to traditional owners vary, and are arrived at 
through bargaining between traditional owners and the store committee. 
Fieldwork data suggest that amounts paid to traditional owners are often quite 
nominal in absolute terms, but may be substantial in the light of people’s 
extremely low incomes. For example, in Ntaria the rent paid to all traditional 
owners amounts to $4,500 per clan group per year. In Maningrida amounts paid 
to traditional owners, in the form of subsidised rent (traditional owners on CDEP 
pay only $4 per fortnight rent, as opposed to other CDEP participants who pay 
$20 per fortnight), are more generous but still amount to only $416 per person 
per year. 
Finally, evidence suggests that traditional owners have rejected applications from 
a number of prospective businesses. For example, the Central Land Council has 
indicated that a number of tourism proposals have been rejected by traditional 
owners on the ground that they were culturally inappropriate (pers. comm. Tony 
Keyes). The right of traditional owners to reject applications is a potential barrier 
to competition. In communications with the CLC, it was indicated that traditional 
owners who were already receiving rental payments from a community store 
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might not be supportive of the idea of another store acting as competition to it 
(pers. comm. Tony Keyes). It is admittedly not uncommon in many jurisdictions 
(even cities) to have to obtain necessary permits prior to operating a particular 
business on certain land. However, in general the process of the granting (or 
otherwise) of a permit in such jurisdictions is expected to follow reasonably 
transparent and codified principles, such as those contained in planning laws. 
This is not the case in remote Aboriginal communities. 
Even where community stores are established and have been in operation for an 
extended period of time, they can face a number of difficulties in relation to rent 
paid to traditional owners. Wells offers an example of the problems faced by a 
number of ALPA stores with rental payments. She notes the comments made at 
the 1984 ALPA annual meeting: 
Traditional landowners, by the law, are entitled to some rent, and this must be fixed 
once and for all, so that everyone is happy with what is happening. We have talked 
with NLC [Northern Land Council] on what is a fair rent to pay. This committee must 
try and work out a plan that is fair to ALPA … there [are] a number of skills that 
Aboriginal people have which Balanda do not have, and deciding on rent to 
landowners is one of those skills (Wells 1993: 164). 
The meeting resolved that rent would be paid to traditional owners (for the land) 
and the Council (as owners of the store building), and would be distributed by 
community councils (Wells 1993: 164-5). However, problems with payments to 
traditional owners continued. Wells reports that while ALPA has been honouring 
its lease agreements since 1985, money often does not reach the traditional 
owners (1993: 165). She notes that councils have been in the invidious position of 
not having enough money to provide services and yet being in charge of 
distributing money to traditional owners. As a consequence payments to 
traditional owners were often not made. Moreover, in some communities there is a 
conflict as to whose land the community store is actually on, making distribution 
of rent to traditional owners even more difficult (1993: 165).  
Labour costs 
Another factor which may impact on the cost structure of businesses in remote 
communities is the cost of getting qualified labour. These supposedly high labour 
costs are used to justify high prices. Deloittes’ data indicate that the direct wage 
and salaries costs faced by stores in their sample was approximately 12 per cent 
of average annual turnover. In addition to stipulated wage costs managers also 
incur ‘additional expenses’ and ‘travel and accommodation’ costs although these 
are reasonably small relative to average annual turnover. Together these costs, in 
addition to the costs of wages and salaries, bring the labour costs of an average 
community store in the Deloittes sample to 13.2 per cent of average annual 
turnover in the years 1995, 1998 and 2000 (see Table 1). However, data gathered 
during fieldwork indicate that in some cases wage costs associated with 
community stores may be much higher, and in one case made up as much as 40 
per cent of annual turnover. Such high labour costs may reflect overstaffing or 
may indicate that some managers of stores with a large degree of market power 
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inflate staffing costs by paying themselves (and often other family members) large 
salaries, and then either increase prices or return a lower profit to the 
community.  
Part of the labour cost associated with the operation of community stores may be 
in the hiring of Aboriginal labour. Community stores are an important source of 
employment opportunities for Aboriginal people located in remote areas. In 
relation to this point Young et al. write: 
The issue of Aboriginal employment in the stores, particularly at those levels 
demanding higher levels of skill and more responsibility, is of key importance … 
Store work … gives people skills which are transferable to other key areas, such as 
working in the council or school office, or running another type of business (1993: 
8). 
It appears that a number of remote stores utilise Aboriginal labour. Table 3 
details the employment characteristics of community stores in the Northern 
Territory in 2000. Of the 56 stores surveyed, only ten reported that they did not 
employ any Aboriginal staff. Further, the stores in the survey reported that 
approximately 60 per cent of all staff employed were Aboriginal.  
Table 3. Employment characteristics of remote stores in the Northern 
Territory, 2000 
District  
Darwin 
 
Katherine 
East 
Arnhem 
Alice 
Springs 
Barkly Total no. 
 of stores 
Stores with no Aboriginal 
employees 
 
1 
 
5 
 
1 
 
0 
 
3 
 
10 
Aboriginal employees 97 55 67 6 12 237 
Total employees 133 106 96 16 46 397 
Total stores surveyed 14 21 6 6 9 56 
Source: THS 2000. 
In spite of the level of Aboriginal employment detailed in Table 3, none of the 
stores surveyed during fieldwork in central Australia appeared to employ 
Aboriginal workers. During interviews a number of store managers express 
reservations about using Aboriginal labour. These included that Aboriginal 
workers did not turn up for work and, in particular, that they were tardy or often 
absent from shifts or away from work on ceremonial business for long periods of 
time. In addition it was commented that ‘training was an ongoing problem 
because Aboriginal people were not really interested in working in the store’, and 
that cultural obligations (such as the demand sharing obligations discussed 
above) also presented problems when hiring Aboriginal workers. 
Key findings 
The key findings of this paper that have implications for ACCC compliance and 
education strategies are as follows: 
 MCDONNELL AND MARTIN 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
30
• Consumers need to be aware of the TPA and the obligations it imposes on 
businesses before they can take action if there has been a breach. The 
fieldwork and literature review indicate that neither Aboriginal consumers 
nor Aboriginally operated businesses have much understanding of the TPA 
and how it operates. This suggests that a directed consumer education 
strategy may be needed. In addition, the ACCC may wish to become more 
involved in proactive monitoring of TPA breaches that impact upon 
Aboriginal consumers. 
• Another finding of this research has been the diversity of experience of 
Aboriginal consumers and businesses. This must be taken into account 
when designing consumer education materials for Aboriginal people. 
• Community stores are the main socioeconomic institution in many remote 
Aboriginal communities. The way in which community stores are operated, 
and their corresponding pricing policy, have a dramatic impact on the 
welfare of their host populations. For this reason it is strongly recommended 
that the code of conduct developed for community stores be supported both 
through monitoring and through TPA compliance education for store 
managers. 
• Governance is identified as a major issue for enhancing Aboriginal welfare in 
remote communities. While not an ACCC responsibility, the way stores and 
Aboriginal communities are governed has clear implications for consumer 
rights and the general welfare of Aboriginal consumers. For this reason this 
paper recommends that the ACCC become involved in developing a TPA-
related education program for store committees and other peak Aboriginal 
governing bodies. 
• The ACCC must recognise that there is a gulf between Aboriginal cultural 
and non-Aboriginal legal understandings and expectations about how stores 
should operate. Store committees and local councils have to balance the 
obligations imposed upon them by both the cultural context in which they 
operate and the general Australian legal system. While these obligations are 
not always in conflict, they must be recognised before any changes can be 
made to the way store committees currently operate. 
• The cost of freight and labour may not be major impediments to the 
operation of stores in remote Aboriginal communities. By contrast, it appears 
that the ALRA may present something of a legislative barrier to the operation 
of competitive markets in remote Aboriginal communities. However, there are 
very strong public interest arguments that militate against the erosion of 
existing land rights legislation. 
• Market sharing arrangements may be taking place amongst community 
stores in remote Aboriginal communities. This seems to indicate the need for 
TPA compliance education to be directed specifically at store managers. 
• Understanding of Aboriginal agency must inform any action taken by the 
ACCC for breaches of the TPA. It is important to recognise that it is not 
necessarily through lack of education that Aboriginal consumers are 
participating in what are perceived by others to be exploitative transactions. 
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Implications for ACCC compliance and education strategies 
Questions remain as to when the ACCC should take action over breaches of the 
TPA that impact upon Aboriginal consumers. A suggestive analogy may lie in the 
operations of the Northern Territory Liquor Licensing Commission in remote 
areas. There are numerous analyses of Aboriginal alcohol consumption patterns 
which suggest that some of the underlying factors relate to particular distinctive 
Aboriginal values and practices (e.g. Brady 1991; d’Abbs et al. 1994; Martin 
1998). The Commission has adopted a highly proactive and best-practice 
program, in consultation with community organisations, in order to reduce 
harmful drinking practices by a variety of mechanisms. Measures include limiting 
opening times to avoid periods when people receive their pays or pensions, 
restricting takeaway sales in various ways, negotiating voluntary agreements with 
publicans, and instituting local and regional controls over the times and types of 
alcohol sales. That is, the Commission has recognised the particular vulnerability 
of Aboriginal people—both drinkers and non-drinkers—to the problems 
occasioned by excessive alcohol consumption, even from sales practices which are 
not in technical breach of the relevant statutes.  
The analysis in this paper suggests a number of options that the ACCC may wish 
to consider so as to further enhance the welfare of Aboriginal people in remote 
communities. We return now to the concept of the frontier economy, defined as 
the zone of intersection between the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal domains (see 
Fig. 1). This paper has attempted to take account of specific economic practices of 
both Aboriginal businesses (exemplified by Aboriginal community stores) and 
Aboriginal consumers. In accordance with the research aims of this project, these 
economic practices inform the ‘special characteristics of Aboriginal communities 
which … should be taken into account in any ACCC compliance and education 
strategies’.  
Details of possible breaches of the TPA in remote Aboriginal communities are 
contained in Appendix 1. Evaluation of prospective breaches of the TPA requires a 
culturally-informed understanding of why Aboriginal people may continue to 
participate in relationships that have the potential to be exploitative. Designing 
appropriate compliance and consumer education strategies requires an 
understanding of specific Aboriginal economic values and the way these values 
may inform market transactions (see Fig. 4). Sales practices which might be 
potentially unconscionable in terms of the TPA, for example, might result in part 
from Aboriginal agency, or suit particular Aboriginal purposes. The case study 
detailed in relation to this point was that of a pastoral station store. An important 
question that arises from this analysis is what the role of the ACCC should be in 
such circumstances. If particular sales practices suit Aboriginal customers, 
should they be left as they are?  
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Fig. 4. Designing appropriate compliance and consumer education 
strategies 
 
 
Proactive monitoring and intervention  
In a recent article on the sale of alcohol using book-up, a journalist noted that 
‘it’s difficult to get people to make complaints because they are complicit in the 
whole thing’ (Martin 2002). Similarly, the small number of publicised 
investigations of TPA breaches in remote Aboriginal communities is not indicative 
of the fact that no TPA breaches are occurring (see Appendix 1), but rather the 
fact that such breaches may go unreported. The Chairman of the ACCC, Dr Allan 
Fels, himself noted at a recent conference that he is aware that Aboriginal people 
seldom complain to bodies like the ACCC: ‘There are reasons for this related to 
disadvantage, culture and access’ (Fels 2002: 4). Possible reasons include a lack 
of awareness of the TPA coupled with the difficulty in accessing a phone in remote 
communities, and low levels of literacy. To some extent these factors must impede 
on the operation of the TPA in remote Aboriginal Australia. 
In the long term the measure of the success of ACCC programs directed to 
Indigenous Australians may be the number of complaints received from 
Indigenous people. However, in the short term, if reliance on complaints and 
feedback from Aboriginal consumers is unlikely to be effective, then this suggests 
a need for alternative strategies. In particular it suggests that the ACCC should 
become more proactive in monitoring and intervening in Aboriginal TPA-related 
issues. Many remote communities operate in a legislative vacuum, away from the 
purview of the law. In this context it becomes increasingly important for 
regulatory agencies to develop ways of monitoring the activities of firms and 
individuals, particularly with respect to consumer rights issues. Ideally this would 
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involve direct field monitoring. While it is recognised that State and Territory fair 
trading agencies generally deal with localised consumer matters, fieldwork would 
suggest that these departments are not funded to proactively monitor matters 
arising in remote communities. In addition, it appears that a number of 
Aboriginal consumer issues, such as unconscionable used-car and door-to-door 
sales practices and letter scams, are of concern in a large number of Aboriginal 
communities. Such systemic problems seem to indicate that a federal approach, 
or a federally directed approach, is needed. Thus it may be that direct field 
monitoring is best performed by agents of the ACCC. There are however obvious 
resource implications from such an option.  
Strategic linkages 
One way of avoiding some of the costs of direct monitoring of TPA breaches in 
remote Aboriginal communities would be to develop strategic linkages with key 
Aboriginal agencies. This would allow potential breaches to be reported by these 
agencies rather than via Aboriginal consumers themselves. While some linkages 
between ATSIC and the ACCC have already been established, it is important that 
regional linkages are also explored. Regional Aboriginal agencies are best placed 
to collect information relating to prospective breaches of the TPA in remote 
Aboriginal communities. Thus the ACCC may wish to pursue linkages with 
various ATSIC regions as well as other regional Aboriginal agencies such as Land 
Councils and Aboriginal legal aid organisations. Consumer education strategies 
should also be directed towards these agencies. 
The ACCC may also wish to consider taking a more proactive coordinating role in 
the activities of the various State and Territory fair trading agencies with respect 
to issues of concern to Aboriginal people. At present there seems to be a large 
degree of duplication in Aboriginal-related issues and in the materials being 
developed by the various agencies. In addition, while many agencies have 
identified some key issues that impact upon Aboriginal consumers, for example 
the sale of used cars, they have not developed any strategic programs, beyond 
limited education of Aboriginal consumers, to avoid such problematic 
transactions occurring in the future. Further, many of the key Aboriginal 
consumer protection issues identified in the Appendix to this paper, such as the 
sale of used cars and door-to-door sales, are issues that have also been identified 
by a number of State and Territory fair trading agencies. It is clear that these 
issues extend across State borders, indicating that there may be a role for the 
ACCC in coordinating a federal response to consumer protection measures in 
these areas. 
Consumer education  
Another aspect of the coordinating role that the ACCC may wish to pursue is the 
development of Aboriginal-specific consumer education material. Much of the 
material that is currently aimed at Aboriginal people is inaccessible to them, in 
that it is written in complex English. None of these materials appear to have been 
developed in consultation with Aboriginal people or communities. Nor does it 
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appear that any of agencies concerned conduct extensive oral workshops on 
consumer education in communities.  
The key to an understanding of Aboriginal agency is the realisation that it is not 
only through lack of education that Aboriginal consumers participate in what are 
perceived by others to be exploitative transactions. The argument made in this 
paper would suggest that while general consumer education materials in 
appropriate formats may have utility, it would be far more effective to provide 
targeted information to, for example, the committees and boards of community 
stores, community councils, and other relevant Aboriginal organisations. Peak 
Aboriginal governing bodies have little or no understanding of how the TPA 
operates. One way of ameliorating this problem may be to conduct a corporate 
governance program with these bodies which includes, amongst other things, a 
section on the operation of the TPA. 
Another group that the ACCC may wish to consider targeting for TPA training are 
the store managers of community stores. Since most store managers are non-
Aboriginal and literate there would probably be no need to develop specific 
competition and consumer materials. This training could be viewed as important 
to ensuring compliance with the competition and consumer provisions of the 
‘store charter’ (detailed below). Further, the presence of market sharing 
arrangements in community stores also seem to indicate the need for TPA 
compliance education to be directed at store managers. Materials could be 
provided to accompany the store charter and the ACCC could take steps to 
ensure that store managers understood what they were signing on to.  
By contrast, the preferred model for the delivery of general TPA competition and 
consumer education material for Aboriginal groups is orally based communication 
in the context of workshops, ideally given by an Aboriginal person who travels to 
the community (Aboriginal Consumer Education Project 1994). Pictorial 
representations are essential given the high level of Aboriginal illiteracy, and 
where English is used it should be plain and concise. More generally, the ACCC 
may also wish to look at employing a radio media outlet (such as Warlpiri Media) 
to design a consumer education program. Such a program would have the 
advantage of being a reasonably inexpensive and highly accessible means to raise 
awareness in remote Aboriginal Australia. Finally, if a telephone line is to be the 
point of contact for people accessing information from either the ACCC or various 
State fair-trading agencies, as is usually the case, then the number should be a 
‘freecall’ number and staff should be trained to use plain English. The ACCC may 
also wish to investigate the idea of employing Aboriginal liaison officers to follow 
up complaints from various communities. This would be in keeping with the idea 
of proactive monitoring detailed above. 
Governance issues 
Governance of stores is identified as a major issue for enhancing Aboriginal 
welfare in remote communities. While not denying the importance of introducing 
or maintaining a degree of competition, in and of itself competition cannot fully 
enhance consumer welfare while governance structures remain as they are.  
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While it is not a ACCC responsibility, the way stores are governed has clear 
implications for consumer rights and the general welfare of Aboriginal consumers. 
Key to the governance problems faced by most community stores is a lack of 
accountability. One possibility for improving accountability is the development of 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between the ACCC, the regulatory 
authorities of the various statutes under which stores are incorporated and 
possibly ATSIC, to develop systematic education and monitoring processes for 
store committees. Thus, the ACCC has had an MoU in place with State and 
Territory fair trading agencies and ASIC for some time. A further such alliance 
has also been pursued in relation to the development of a ‘store charter’ 
(discussed below). These alliances may prove useful in both educating other 
agencies about the work of the ACCC as well as developing mechanisms to better 
monitor the operation of community stores. 
Codes of conduct 
Development of a code of conduct by which stores operate may be useful in 
ensuring that a minimum standard of service and perhaps quality of goods is 
maintained. Such a code of conduct, termed a ‘store charter’, has recently been 
drafted by the ACCC in conjunction with a group consisting of the Banking 
Industry Ombudsman (Colin Neave), the Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination 
Commissioner (Tom Stodulka), the Northern Territory Department of Industries 
and Business CEO (John Carroll) and ATSIC regional staff. Fieldwork 
investigations seem to indicate that a number of stores do not display prices for 
goods. Thus it is particularly important that the code requires that prices be 
included either on goods or on the shelves where goods are stored. This is 
recognised in the store charter which states that, ‘stores will clearly display the 
price of all items available for sale’ (ACCC 2002: 4).  
The development of a voluntary code of conduct may be ineffective if not 
accompanied by both monitoring and the education of store managers in TPA 
compliance. If after a period of time the voluntary code of conduct is deemed 
ineffective then a mandatory code may be necessary. The dependence of large 
sections of the community on the services provided by community stores seems to 
indicate that the provision of these services should be regulated so as to ensure 
that minimum standards are maintained. This is particularly the case where 
community stores exercise a large degree of market power such that entry into a 
voluntary code of conduct does not provide a competitive advantage in a market. 
Some evidence suggests that in a situation of market power customers who do 
complain about, for example, higher prices, are refused service at the store 
(Srivastava 1998). In the long run, a mandatory code may be the only means of 
enabling Aboriginal consumers to exercise their consumer rights. However, even a 
mandatory code would be ineffective if it were unpoliced. For example, despite the 
existence of detailed health regulations there is still anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that some community stores continue to sell stock that is unfit for human 
consumption. Finally, if a mandatory code is established there must be some way 
of attempting to ensure that it does not further increase the prices paid by 
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consumers at community stores. Without such an assurance it may be that 
consumer welfare in remote Aboriginal communities will be further eroded. 
 
Notes 
1. There is provision in the TPA for the authorisation of anti-competitive conduct (s. 
88), where such conduct would be of benefit to society. Thus the test under this 
section is whether the anti-competitive conduct would be of public benefit.   
2. Until recently such fees may have fallen outside the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
(UCCC) provided that they did not cover lending for a period of less than 62 days. 
However, the Code has just been amended to cover pay day lending (i.e. lending a 
small amount of money repayable on the customer’s next pay day). It may be that 
these provisions may also cover the fees on borrowing charged by community stores. 
3. The definition of a market is contained in s. 4(E) of the TPA, which provides that: ‘[a] 
market means a market in Australia and, when used in relation to goods and 
services, includes a market for those goods and services and any other goods and 
services that are substitutable for, or otherwise competitive with, the first mentioned 
goods and services.’ 
4. Prices charged for goods are the focal point for most discussions of the operation of 
remote community stores. Both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people often express 
concern at the prices charged at their local community store. Wells (1993: 160) notes 
that ‘pricing policy is an especially important issue at a broad based community 
level’. There are numerous accounts of the high prices charged for goods in remote 
communities relative to urban centres (Crough & Christopherson 1993; Sullivan et 
al. 1987; Leonard 1998). Recent studies conducted by the NT Government’s Health 
Service indicate that the cost of a basket of goods in most remote community stores 
in the NT relative to the equivalent basket of goods purchased in Darwin was 28% 
higher (THS 2000: 8). While there are a number of limitations in these studies (see 
Altman, McDonnell & Ward 2001: 5–6) there is a substantial body of evidence that 
prices in remote communities are higher than in urban centres. 
5. How much it will impact on a community will depend, in part, on the degree of self-
provisioning activities, such as collection of bush foods, that community members 
engage in (see Altman, McDonnell & Ward 2001: 6). It will also depend on the ability 
of community members to obtain provisions from other stores outside the region, 
either directly themselves, or through family members. 
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Appendix 1. Possible TPA-related breaches that impact upon 
Indigenous people 
Possible unconscionable conduct (s. 51 AA; s. 51AB) 
Arguments as to whether transactions entered into by Indigenous consumers are 
unconscionable must take account of both Indigenous agency and the often 
heightened vulnerability of Indigenous consumers relative to other consumers. 
While Indigenous consumers do not constitute a class of ‘special disability’, in 
general Indigenous consumers, and particularly those in remote communities, are 
more likely to have lower levels of education, literacy and consumer awareness 
than non-Indigenous consumers, and be less able to access to independent legal 
advice (Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Amadio). In addition, Indigenous 
consumers in remote areas are likely to be more dependent on single providers of 
goods and services, such as community stores.  
• Overcharging for taxi services and alcohol—The literature contains 
allegations that taxi drivers overcharge for services to town camps around 
Alice Springs (Commonwealth Ombudsman 1997). The Commonwealth 
Ombudsman also notes instances of Indigenous people being overcharged 
for alcohol. There is anecdotal evidence from the Northern Territory that 
the price of alcohol is sometimes increased dramatically to coincide with 
days on which welfares payment are made. Mechanical repairs for cars 
have also been identified as being priced at above market rates for 
Indigenous consumers (Cultural Perspectives 1998). While overcharging for 
goods and services is itself not a TPA issue, the fact that these practices are 
directed towards Indigenous consumers, and are different to the services 
offered to non-Indigenous people may be indicative of an unconscionable 
practice (see Altman, McDonnell & Ward 2001: 10).  Such an interpretation 
would be consistent with s. 51 AB (2)(e) under which ‘the amount for 
which, and circumstances under which, the consumer could have acquired 
equivalent goods or services from another party’ will be taken into account 
in assessing whether a transaction was unconscionable.  
• Used-car dealers—During fieldwork a number of Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people interviewed (including representatives of various 
consumer agencies) indicated that Indigenous people were often sold cars 
at significantly above market rates. In interviews conducted during 
fieldwork, a number of people told of individuals who brought cars over the 
border into the Northern Territory to coincide with royalty payments being 
made to communities. These cars were then sold at highly inflated prices. 
In Alice Springs there were also accounts of a number of people, including 
art dealers, running small unregistered used-car businesses aimed at the 
Indigenous market as a means of supplementing their income. Two key 
consumer reports also note instances of cars being sold to Indigenous 
consumers at prices that are double, or triple their market value (Bell & 
Johnson 2001; Commonwealth Ombudsman 1997).  
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Cars are particularly prized possessions in remote communities. Elsewhere 
in this paper it has been argued that the value Warlpiri men, for example, 
accord to cars is not constructed against that of the regional used car 
market, but in terms of their role in the primarily masculine pursuits such 
as hunting, attendance at ceremonies, and visiting kin across a huge 
region. Thus it may be that Walpiri males’ demand for used cars is more 
inelastic than non-Indigenous consumers’ demand for cars. The ability of 
used-car salespeople to exploit the more inelastic demand curve of 
Indigenous consumers could be considered good business practice, but it 
might equally be interpreted as unconscionable conduct. 
• Book-up (or book-down) practices—One interpretation of book-up practices 
is that they result in exploitation of Indigenous consumers’ lesser 
bargaining position and as such may be unconscionable. For example, in 
accordance with the factors specified in s. 51 AB (2) it could possibly be 
argued that an Indigenous consumer who enters into a book-up 
arrangement, who has low level of literacy and education (s. 51AB (2)(a)) 
and who is pressured into using book-up arrangements on the basis that 
there are no other financial services available to them and they were 
hungry and needed food (s. 51AB (2)(b)), and who is required to leave their 
key-card and PIN-number as security (s. 51 AB (2)(c)) is being subjected to 
unconscionable practices. This is particularly the case if the fees charged 
for book-up are exorbitant compared with the fees charged for other 
financial services (s. 51 AB [2](d)). This last point however assumes that 
Indigenous consumers have access to credit from alternative sources—an 
assumption that can be problematic particularly in remote areas. Thus 
another possible interpretation of book-up is that it provides an essential 
service to Indigenous people who otherwise would not have access to 
credit. It is possible that in some cases book-up has the potential to benefit 
Indigenous consumers (for a more detailed discussion of book-up see 
Altman, McDonnell & Ward 2001: 12).  
• Book-up and alcohol consumption—A recent report (Martin 2002) indicates 
that in communities in Western Australia, publicans are taking key cards 
and PIN numbers in return for providing people with alcohol. Evidence 
exists of a single publican at Kookynie holding onto the cards of 200 
Aboriginal people. Such transactions seem particularly unconsionable 
where people are alcohol dependent and thus particularly vulnerable to 
being pressured into using book-up arrangements in order to purchase 
alcohol. Finally, it should be noted that selling alcohol on credit may be in 
breach of the store’s. licence to sell alcohol, as is the case with many of the 
alcohol licences issued in the Northern Territory. Such matters however are 
more properly in the province of the relevant liquor licensing agency than 
that of the ACCC. 
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Possible misleading and deceptive conduct and/or misrepresentation 
(s. 52; s. 53). 
The issues detailed below seem to indicate that many Indigenous people, and 
particularly those located in rural and remote areas, are vulnerable to misleading 
representations made during face-to-face transactions.  
• Door-to-door sales—TPA investigations to date seem to identify that 
Indigenous people may be particularly vulnerable to representations made 
by door-to-door salespeople (see Altman, McDonnell & Ward 2001). A 
recent Queensland Legal Aid report (2001) on Cape York Indigenous 
communities offers further evidence concerning a travelling salesman who 
sold vacuum cleaners on hire purchase agreements for $3000 each to a 
number of women located in remote Indigenous communities. Payment for 
the vacuum cleaners was arranged through a finance company.  
• Mobile phones—During fieldwork interviews a number of people gave 
accounts of mobile phones being sold to Indigenous people who, upon 
returning to the remote community in which they live, realise that the 
phone does not work as they have no coverage. A number of Indigenous 
people commented that during trips to Alice Springs they had purchased 
mobile phones because of signs saying ‘free phone’ or because the 
salesperson had told them they did not have to pay for the phone. People 
were then asked to sign contracts. Problems with mobile phones are 
compounded when phones are paid for using automatic deductions from a 
consumer’s account. Thus a consumer may be having a service fee 
deducted from their account for a phone that they cannot use.  
 A recent ACCC (2001) investigation against Total Communications details 
some of the problems that can arise in the purchase of mobile phones 
when the terms and conditions of the contracts are not fully disclosed. 
However, in the scenario detailed above even if the terms under which the 
phone was purchased are not considered a breach, it is likely that 
representations suggesting that the phone was free, if found to be 
inaccurate, would be. 
Possible abuse of market power 
• Monopoly selling—Where stores, retail outlets or taxis hold people’s bank 
cards as a form of book-up, this may create a monopoly (Commonwealth 
Ombudsman 1997; Westcombe 1998) because people whose cards are 
being held cannot purchase food or goods from other stores and thus 
become a captive market. Such a monopoly restricts competition and may 
be an abuse of market power in accordance with s. 46 of the TPA. 
• Market sharing agreements—Evidence gathered from one community 
suggested a market sharing arrangement such that one store sold sporting 
goods and clothing while another store sold petrol and goods to tourists. It 
is unclear how extensive such agreements are, whether they operate to the 
detriment of consumers, or whether examples of similar arrangements exist 
 MCDONNELL AND MARTIN 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
40
in other communities. If it could be established that market sharing 
arrangements were in operation then they may be in breach of s. 45 of the 
TPA. 
Possible breaches of specific provisions 
• Credit cards—During interviews in two communities accounts were given of 
unsolicited credit cards being sent to people for amounts of money that 
they probably had no capacity to repay. We were told of one Indigenous 
couple who were receiving welfare payments and who had been sent a 
credit card with a $1000 credit limit. The couple had quickly spent the 
$1000 and were now trying to manage the debt on their welfare payments. 
This practice would seem to be in breach of s. 63A of the TPA. 
• Letter scams—Letters are being sent to Indigenous people in remote 
communities detailing winnings and asking for a payment to be sent. 
During fieldwork in Aurukun, David Martin was shown a letter that offered 
a prize in return for money sent overseas. These letters clearly involve 
misleading and deceptive conduct, and so would breach s. 52 of the TPA. 
In addition, letters that offer gifts or prizes with no intention of providing 
them breach s. 53 C of the TPA. 
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